Strengthening civil society constitutes an increasingly important element in the array of positive aid measures adopted by aid donors as part of the good government agenda. Although donors have long supported civic associations, often through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the volume of aid allocated for this purpose has generally been small and it has been peripheral to the main aid policy agenda. The article begins by exploring the rationale behind this shift in emphasis, highlighting the interplay of domestic and international factors. It then surveys the range of meanings attributed to the concept in academic debate and the role of civil society in the process of democratic consolidation. The nature of the relationship between civil society and the state in Africa provides a basis for assessing the role of foreign aid and its potential impact on the internal dynamics of civicassociations and their capacity to contribute to political pluralism and democratic consolidation. The conclusion considers the benefits and limitations of this type of aid in strengthening civil society and the types of interventions and funding mechanisms that hold most promise in this regard.
THE RESURGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The 1990s have seen a major upsurge of interest in the concept of civil society and its relevance to understanding democratic transition and consolidation in the developing world. Although the civic realm was acknowledged to be an important locus of organizational activity, few commentators gave the concept serious attention in view of a general pre-occupation with the role of the state and authoritarian forms of government which prevailed in most developing countries. A number of factors help to explain a marked revival of interest in a concept that had received limited attention in scholarly and aid policy circles, especially in Africa. 1 The experience of democratization in most regions of the developing world from the early 1980s was a major factor in shifting academic concerns from the Important exceptions were Bayart (1986) and various essays in Rothchild and Chazan (1988) ids bulletin vol 26 no 2 1995 70 state to societal institutions. It brought with it an interest in the capacity of civic organizations and new social movements to play an active role in undermining authoritarian rule and contributing to the process of democratic consolidation. This was especially important in Eastern Europe where the all-pervasive state had circumscribed an autonomous sphere of associational life, but in which civil society provided the well-spring for the successful democracy movements of the late 1980s, and a source of inspiration for democracy movements elsewhere in the developing world.
A second explanation stems from economic factors which have political implications. Sustained economic decline and mismanagement in much of Africa in the 1980s under the aegis of statist regimes was often accompanied by disengagement from the formal economy, marked by the withdrawal of the peasantry from the market back into subsistence production, outward migration and the spread of the parallel economy characterized by hoarding, currency exchange, smuggling and other illegal activities. This process of disengagement further undermined the legitimacy of the state and weakened its links with societal institutions (Chazan 1988) . In some contexts, such as Zambia, Côte D'Ivoire and Benin, the weakening of the state's legitimacy and its control over society gave succour to pro-democracy movements, whereas in countries such as Liberia and Somalia it gave rise to destructive tendencies promoted by ethnic and regional interests competing for political power (Bratton and van de Walle 1992). shifted the balance of power and social responsibility away from the state in favour of societal institutions. This is reinforced by expectations on the part of aid donors that NGOs in particular will play an increasingly significant role in service delivery and poverty alleviation programmes.
Fourth, problems encountered in the application of political conditionality as a means of fostering political reform and good government have focused donor attention on the potential for promoting these objectives through positive aid measures (Moore and Robinson 1994) . These have included channelling aid to civic associations and organized interest groups with a view to enhancing democratic consolidation and political participation. The success of such initiatives in Chile and South Africa has increased donors' confidence in their potential elsewhere. Recipients of such assistance typically include NGOs, business and professional associations (principally lawyers and journalists), trade unions, womens' organizations, and human rights groups. All of these are deemed as constituting key organizations in civil society, but there is little agreement about what is conveyed by the term or the objectives of directing aid to such organizations.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
There are many competing interpretations of civil society, which have their origins in various currents of western political philosophy.2 In the liberal tradition, civil society is defined as a public realm located between the family and the state, consisting of a plurality of civil associations. The formation of such associations by citizens of their own volition can counteract the potential abuse of power and wealth. They also function to nurture civil and political rights, to advocate popular demands and to promote democratic values. These ideas were challenged by theorists such as Hegel and Marx who espoused an historicist approach, in which civil society is seen as the product of a long process of historical transformation governed by the emergence of a sphere of market relations under capitalism. This notion was developed further by Antonio Gramsci, who treated civil society as an inherently conflictual arena, where civic institutions reproduce and disseminate the hegemonic ideas and values 1 For a comprehensive review see Keane (1988) and Bobbio (1988) .
-'I associated with capitalism, but which are subject to contestation.
Clearly these two traditions are associated with very different interpretations of civil society, which have significant operational implications, since most aid donors are inclined towards the liberal interpretation. However, some writers have discerned a degree of convergence between the two traditions centring on the claim that civil society is a distinct public realm located between the family and the state, where individuals join together to pursue collective goals (Bratton 1994: 55-6) . Civil society therefore includes a wide array of organizations which have a range of objectives stemming from the shared interests of their members. According to Stepan (1988) , it is distinct from political society, which includes political parties, legislatures and elections, through which organized interests enter into coalitions and compete for political power. Diamond (1994) has classified civil society organizations into seven categories depending on their goals and membership: (1) economic (productive and commercial associations and networks); (2) cultural (religious, communal and ethnic associations); (3) informational and educational (organizations dedicated to the production and circulation of ideas and information); (4) interest-based (designed to advance the interests of workers, professionals, etc.); (5) developmental (NGOs and self-help groups); (6) issue-oriented (movements for environmental protection, womens' rights, etc.) and (7) civic (aimed at strengthening the political system and imparting democratic values). According to Diamond civil society also encompasses the mass media and other institutions which contribute to the flow of information and ideas (such as universities, publishing houses, etc.) but which do not represent associations formed by organized interests. Such a typology resonates with the pluralist approach favoured by most aid donors who conceive civil society as an aggregation of organized interests pursuing a benign and rational political agenda.
For example, according to the UNDP:
Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become organized. The organizations of civil society, which represent many diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests are shaped to fit their social base, constituency, thematic orientations (e.g. environment, gender, human rights) and types of activity. They include church related groups, trade unions, cooperatives, service organizations, community groups and youth organizations, as well as academic institutions and others (Riddell arid Bebbington 1995: 23). For many commentators, the concept only attains practical significance when considered in relation to the state, and more specifically, the process of democratization. As indicated in the previous section, civil society emerged into popular discourse in the late 1980s by virtue of the prominent role played by civic associations in democratic transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe, especially by those representing the working class, professionals, students and new social movements which, in many instances, joined forces into a 'popular upsurge' against incumbent authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). The pivotal role played by mass protest in political transition in Africa has also received attention. According to Bratton (1994) , three broad, primarily urban-based, groups have been important in the African context: the popular classes of self-employed peasants, artisans and vendors; the unionized working class; and the middle classes consisting of entrepreneurs, administrators and professionals. Prompted by a combination of economic malaise and political atrophy, these strata joined forces to challenge the authority and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes across the continent, in many cases giving rise to a process of democratic transition. This process was generally short-lived, culminating in multi-party elections or in the installation of a caretaker government to negotiate the form of a successor regime. At this point, the institutions of political society assumed a more prominent role in completing the transition from authoritarian rule, centred on political parties competing for power through elections. Having achieved their po'itical objective, civic organizations, especially those representing professionals and the middle class, assumed a more neutral role, taking on responsibility for voter registration, election monitoring and human rights work. Now that this phase is largely complete, interest is increasingly focusing on the role played by civil society in democratic consolidation, defined as the process whereby democracy attains widespread 72 acceptance as the preferred system for the conduct of political affairs, since this has yet to be achieved in most African countries which have undergone a political transition. According to Diamond (1994: This type of approach finds resonance among bilateral aid agencies. According a recent paper published by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (1994: 11).
[B]asic to democratization is the development of a pluralist civil society comprised of a range of institutions and associations which represent diverse interests and provide a counterweight to government. Interaction between the formal political regime and civil society contributes to, and also requires, a responsive government, which is one of the characteristics of a functioning democracy. Supporting pluralism, e.g. the development of autonomous civil associations, professional and interest organizations, is an important step in fostering democratization. White (1994) argues that the growth of civil society can contribute to democratic governance in four complementary ways: by altering the balance of power between state and society to achieve a balanced opposition in favour of the latter; enforcing standards of public morality and performance and improving the accountability of politicians and state officials; transmitting the demands and articulating the interests of organized groups, in the process providing an alternative sphere of representation; and instilling and upholding democratic values. However, as White points out, while civil society holds real potential to influence the process of democratic consolidation, its role and significance in any given context is contingent on the specific character and power of the state and the international political environment.
Civil society organizations in Africa vary considerably in their capacity to contribute to democratic consolidation and, in any case, many of these are neither equipped nor inclined to perform the various roles outlined by White. Indeed, the task of improving the political system and making it more democratic is assigned by Diamond (1994) to a special category of 'civic' organizations, although a range of organizations might be expected to contribute to this process, including womens' groups, business associations and peasant organizations. At the same time it is important to recognize that not all organized interests will share a common view about the desirability of democratic forms of politics; indeed, the experience of post-colonial rule in Africa suggests that in some circumstances social élites might perceive the reinstallation of a democratic regime as an opportunity to gain special favours from corrupt politicians. Other sections of civil society are likely to feel threatened by the prospect of a civilian regime which commands authority and widespread popular support, especially those engaged in illegal or harmful activities such as smuggling and gun-running. Moreover, there are many groups in African society who have no interest in politics or lack the time and resources to enable them to play an effective role in consensusbuilding. On the other hand, grassroots activity might act as a constraint on democracy by separating people from meaningful political participation at the national level. Finally, while the growth of associational activity and the proliferation of voluntary organizations can reinforce societal institutions they may undermine state capacity (Chazan 1992) . Despite these qualifications, there may exist a particular set of conditions in which a wide range of civil society organizations can take on constitutive and disciplinary roles which are supportive of the process of democratic consolidation. Bratton (1994) has identified three such conditionsmaterial, organizational and ideological -which support the emergence of active civil societies in the context of political transition by giving them a base which is independent from that of the state. In the classical Marxist tradition, material conditions are a function of the ability of groups and individuals to accumulate capital and hence are contingent on the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie. The political affiliations of this class are substantially affected by economic performance and the ability of the government to create the conditions in which independent enterprises can prosper. Moreover, the existence of a middle class is often held to be key to the consolidation of a functioning democracy. The organizational realm refers to intermediate associations in civil society and the organizational While these three factors are important, access to resources is a critical determinant of the ability of civic organizations to make an effective contribution to democratic consolidation. These take the form of financial as well as organizational and ideological resources. The resources available to civic organizations emerging from a protracted period of authoritarian rule are usually fairly meagre on account of suppression and limited access to outside information. Many organizations are formed during the process of political liberalization and do not have strong social foundations. These will have considerable experience of challenging authoritarian regimes but little knowledge of building democratic government since mobilizing public opinion against authoritarian rule is far easier than active promotion of democratic values and political participation. The absence of a strong organizational base can limit the legitimacy they possess and the skills base on which they are able to draw. At the same time, while insufficient financial resources and limited technical expertise have posed problems for civil society organizations, the mobilization of funds through membership contributions has proved possible, especially for local credit unions and development groups, but also for trade unions and professional associations, and can enhance their legitimacy and accountability. In this respect Chazan (1992: 290) notes that 'associational autonomy is more central to the vitality of civil societies than the availability of adequate means'.
Nevertheless, in situations where the ability to mobilize domestic financial resources is highly circumscribed, outside support can play a vital role in strengthening the capacity of civic organizations to build and sustain democracy in the fragile conditions that many contemporary African societies are facing. External support derives principally from official aid donors, but historically assistance from political foundations, non-governmental organizations, international federations representing business and the professions (for example through the Rotarians and the Lions Clubs), trade unions, and churches has made a significant contribution. Although aid designed to strengthen civil society can be interpreted very broadly, the principal focus NGOs represent only one category within the panoply of organizations supported by donors for furthering democratic goals, and it is primarily advocacy-based organizations rather than development NGO5 engaged in service delivery which perform this role. It is also doubtful whether NGO5 actually form part of civil society, since they are generally function as intermediaries between donors and civil society organizations, as 74 Germany has also long been involved in democracy promotion centring on support for political parties, trade unions and civil society organizations. The German Stiftungen (political foundations) aligned to the three major political parties, were originally founded for internal political education after World War II, but became active in international political projects in the 1950s. After the creation of the German ministry for overseas development in 1961, the government channelled funds to the foundations for 'socio-political education' in developing countries. The bulk of the funds are in the form of grants to party-based organizations, but projects to promote trade unions, cooperatives and other civil society organizations are also important. In 1989, funding from the German development ministry to the political foundations amounted to $156 million; a further $183 million was provided to German non-governmental organizations for development work (Pinto-Duschinsky 1991).
The British government has since adopted a similar model, but on a much smaller scale, in the form of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which was established in 1992. Its objectives are to build democratic institutions overseas through support for political parties, human rights groups, trade unions, journalists' and lawyers' organizations, womens' groups, and other civil society organizations. Half the budget is allocated to British political parties to support counterparts in other countries, while the remainder is for all-party or no-party pro-jects. In 1992/93 the Fourtdationprovided grartts totalling US$1,400,000 for 140 projects in three priority regions: Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Anglophone Africa.
Other bilateral aid donors and private foundations have supported similar activities in the past, but not on such a large scale as the American and German governments, and through a variety of institutional mechanisms.4 Most support trade union develop. ment, either through domestic trade union federations or through multilateral bodies like the ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In 1991 support from bilateral agencies for trade union development amounted conduits of resources and information. See Frantz (1987) and Fowler (1991) .
The Ford Foundation has played a very important role in this regard, having provided grants to a range of civil society organizations in developing countries over a number of years.
to US$69 million (out of US$92 million from all sources); almost half of this went to trade unions in Africa, for a variety of projects spanning education, health and safety, and capacity building (ICFTU 1993) . The Danish government is among the larger donors in this area, allocating US$5 million annually to the Danish Trade Union Council for International Development Co-operation. USAID has assisted in the growth and development of business associations in several African countries as part of an initiative to increase the profile of the private sector.
Canada and the Netherlands have given positive support to human rights organizations over a number of years, usually with NGOs serving as intermediaries. Another important area of donor intervention is the promotion of womens' rights, especially in the form of legal awareness programmes, but also through more general capacity building and training programmes for womens' organizations.
A large proportion of donor funding for civil society DrganizatiOns is channelled through NGOs, although it is difficult to distinguish projects designed to strengthen institutional capacity and promote democracy from those which have more narrowly focused development objectives. Examples of the former are the special budget lines created by the European Commission which are open to NGOs: in 1992 US$8 million was allocated for human rights and democracy initiatives, and a further US$8 million for supporting democratization in Chile and Central America, primarily through Latin American and European NGOs.5 Special funds such as these are less common among the bilateral donors (the Dutch government is an exception in this regard since it has special programmes for human rights, trade unions and the media), although a number of NGO projects funded through conventional cofinancing mechanisms have similar objectives. For example, most human rights work supported by CIDA has been undertaken by NGOs, and funds for this have amounted to over US$100 million over the past decade (Riddell and Bebbington 1995: 54) .
Some donors concentrate their efforts on fostering a political and legislative environment which is conducive to the work of civil society organizations, by ensuring that freedoms of expression and association are enshrined in law, and pressing for changes in the legislative framework which govern their activities. A number support civic organizations 75 for discrete democracy-building purposes, in the form of election-monitoring, fostering accountability and transparency in government, and strengthening democratic political institutions. Another approach has been to increase the capacity of organized interest groups to assume a more prominent role in policy dialogue and implementation, by improving their research and advocacy skills, strengthening their organizational base and providing them with equipment and office space. In some cases, increasing the involvement of civic organizations in policy dialogue is designed to broaden the consensus behind a particular development strategy, which in much of Africa centres on economic liberalization and an enhanced role for the private sector.
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLITICAL AID
Although many donors are rapidly increasing the volume of foreign political aid, the overall objectives of projects designed to strengthen civil society organizations are not always clearly stated. For most donors, assisting the growth and development of such organizations is intrinsically a good thing, since it contributes to political pluralism and draws more people into associational life. The expectation is that a vibrant civil society can facilitate political participation and inculcate democratic values by involving marginalized groups and providing them with access to those holding positions of power, although in Africa this potential is generally latent rather than proven (Chazan 1992) . Landell-Mills (1992: 552) identifies four ways in which civil society might be nurtured: (1) by facilitating the dissemination of information; (2) by strengthening the rule of law; (3) by expanding education and the capacity for self-expression and (4) by generating surplus resources to support associational activities without compromising their autonomy. Donor assistance efforts have ranged across all four areas, but in practice most support comes in the form of financial resources and technical assistance.
However, since the overall objectives of foreign political aid are often vague and ill-defined, it is difficult to assess the impact of interventions de- that civil society organizations are working towards a common goal of strengthening democracy without a conflict of interests. This would enable one to identify the most appropriate mechanisms for such assistance and to avoid interventions which might be counter-productive from the point of view of democratic consolidation or damaging in other respects.
The four categories outlined by White (1994) provide a framework through which these questions can be addressed. The first centres on altering the balance of power between the state and society in favour of the latter through the creation of a dense network of civil society organizations. Another problem relates to the limited political agendas of these organizations, especially those representing lawyers, which might ultimately be more interested in pursuing the narrow selfinterests of their members from the point of view of widening opportunities for monetary gain and enhanced status than democratic goals per se.
Moreover, as Chazan has observed, some of the urban-based middle-class groups which assumed a prominent role in movements campaigning for the restoration of democratic rule were active in supporting authoritarian rule in the past (Chazan 1992: 303) . These problems point to the need to establish channels for facilitating dialogue between donors and potential recipients to identify joint priorities and to enable donors to respond to requests for assistance in line with these priorities rather than with donor-driven policy objectives requiring quick and demonstrable results which could result in inappropriate funding decisions.
The third category of intervention lies in the intermediary role performed by civic organizations between the state and society by transmitting and articulating interest group demands. In this capacity civil society organizations seek to promote greater consultation and popular involvement in the process of policy formulation, especially by disadvantaged groups which have traditionally been denied access to political power. It also embraces more activist forms of engagement with the state, where civic organizations employ a variety of means to provide their constituents with greater 'voice' in order to influence state officials and policy decisions. These can range from advocacy efforts centred on the media and political lobbying through to more confrontational approaches involving demonstrations and other forms of non-violent protest.
Donors have placed particular emphasis on improving the scope for participation by marginalized social groups in the public policy process. At the level of development projects this takes the form of popular participation in decision making and policy implementation and NGOs are seen to play an important role in this regard. This concern extends to policy dialogue on the national plane and donors have sought to enhance the capacity of organized interest groups for research and policy analysis to enable them to make more effective interventions in the policy process. Democratization presents new opportunities for interest groups to gain access to state policy makers and public officials, in order to present their particular viewpoint on policy decisions which are likely to affect 77 their members. Donor assistance in the form of training, technical assistance and equipment is complemented by helping governments set up forums through which formal policy dialogue can take place.
One problem with these types of interventions is that relatively small amounts of foreign funding can have a considerable impact on organizational capacity, and create an imbalance in the power and resources available to different organizations. For example, the proclivity of the United States to support business associations is in line with its policy stance of promoting free enterprise and a higher level of support to such organizations can give them privileged access to policy makers and heightened visibility in public policy arenas. This can give rise to special pleading on the part of sectional business interests in favour of policies which are of immediate short-term benefit to their members but potentially harmful to others.
Second, strengthening the capacity of private sector lobby groups and other influential civic organizations for policy dialogue often carries with it an implicit ideological agenda. Efforts to involve more organized interests in the policy process are frequently directed towards creating a more active consensus in favour of economic reform, by giving the potential beneficiaries of reform a greater stake in policy outcomes, but also by mitigating potential opposition from the losers of reform, or at least channelling active opposition into passive acceptance. This is obviously desirable from the point of view of the proponents and funders of structural adjustment programmes since it increases the likelihood of political sustainability, but it might squeeze out room for alternative perspectives and feedback on the adverse impact of economic reform unless provision is made for this. It might also conflict with the ambitions of other donors to promote a redistributive agenda centred on increasing the access of the poor and politically disenfranchised groups to the policy process. Hence, groups which resist or criticize the policy agenda of the government might find themselves marginalized or deliberately sidelined as a result of a desire among donors to strengthen supporters of the prevailing agenda.
A third problem is the possibility of overloading the capacity of government policy-makers to accommodate interest group pressure without damaging the technical consistency of policy initiatives. Many policy makers in adjusting economies in Africa are already under serious pressure of work and those concerned with economic policy spend a considerable amount of time attending to donor requirements and policy conditions; they are often not in a position to respond sympathetically even if they are well disposed to increased policy dialogue. A more serious prospect is that of gridlock where sustained interest group pressure fosters inertia and undermines the capacity of the government to pursue a sustained development strategy (Migdal 1988) . This is unlikely in most African contexts since organized interests are neither sufficiently well organized or numerous to pose a serious threat to state policy making capacity, but it does highlight the need to create some degree of insulation for key policy makers balanced by the creation of formal channels for policy dialogue.
The fourth category of donor intervention concerns the constitutive role performed by civil society organizations, which takes a number of different forms: increasing the legitimacy of the political system by instilling and upholding democratic values through civic education programmes; providing people with experience of participating in democratic debate within these organizations; and in recruiting and training new political leaders.
This is a less contentious area for donor intervention, since these types of activities have been a historic function of civic organizations in democratic societies. Many donors are supporting civic education programmes, voter registration drives and election monitoring. Such interventions have helped to ensure that elections have been reasonably free and fair, but the longer term impact of civic education programmes are more difficult to assess. The problem might come with indiscriminate funding of organizations which do not have a strong base of legitimacy or developed membership, or which do not possess the technical skills and technical expertise to enable them to carry out such functions. Some groups might be formed in response to the availability of donor funding and to further individual political agendas which again highlights the importance of careful appraisal and the need for a thorough understanding of the composition of civil society in the countries in question.
CONCLUSIONS
Many of the problems identified in the previous section are latent and there is as yet insufficient documented evidence to provide a clear picture 78 on the impact of donor interventions designed to strengthen civil society organizations. Some of these problems have been encountered by donors in directly funding development NGOs, especially those concerning a possible erosion of independence and autonomy, and there may be lessons which are of relevance here (Riddell and Bebbington 1995) .
There are, of course, positive reasons why supporting civil society organizations is a laudable objective for aid donors, if they are able to make a more effective contribution to the process of democratic consolidation as a result of external assistance. But there are also a number of caveats. These fall into two groups: following on from the previous section, there are a series of operational concerns relating to the funding relationship, but there are also a set of more fundamental questions stemming from the premises on which donor interventions in this area are founded. often lack an in-country presence. Using mission funds to provide support in response to locally generated requests is favoured by some donors but has its limitations, especially if there is not good donor coordination. These various mechanisms will continue to be used by donors, but there are other mechanisms and approaches which have not been explored and which could help to obviate some of the potential problems highlighted earlier.
For example, it may be more productive for donors to specialize in certain categories of organization with whom they have a certain familiarity or which have a particular expertise. Linking up or twinning domestic organizations with counterparts in developing countries, or between organizations from the same region is a good route to follow since there is much relevant experience that can be shared and they have skills which donors do not possess.
Creating forums through which recipient organizations can exert some degree of influence over the terms on which the support is provided can increase the legitimacy of external funding and ensure that it corresponds to locally defined needs.
On balance, while democracy promotion may be a laudable objective in its own right, there are a number of potential pitfalls confronting donors who are seeking to expand political aid programmes. Some indication of the sorts of problems that might arise has been given along with suggestions about action that could be taken to mitigate these. Although positive support for strengthening civil society organizations has many advantages over political conditionality as a means of advancing good government objectives, donors will need to be realistic about the volume of assistance that can channelled through this mechanism since civil society
